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1 In her introduction to Life as Insinuation: George Santayana’s Hermeneutics of Finite Life and
Human  Self,  Katarzyna  Kremplewska  states  that  the  general  aim  of  her  book  is
“reconstructing George Santayana’s conception of human self as embedded in a larger
project  of  philosophy  of  life”  (xi).  More  specifically,  she  explains  that  she  is
undertaking an inquiry “into the latter in the context of the former” (xvi). Her aim is
not  only  to  reconstruct  Santayana’s  conception  of  the  self,  but  also  show  how  it
provides the basis for understanding a number of key ideas in his philosophy of life or
what she calls “contemplative vitalism” – a fitting term intended to capture both the
material and the spiritual dimensions of Santayana’s philosophy (xiv).  Kremplewska
draws widely from the history of philosophy and the breadth of her discussions are
impressive.  Her  book  is  positively  teeming  with  ideas,  but  the  central  themes  she
addresses after reconstructing Santayana’s conception of the self are his views about of
the tragic conception of human life; his account of human freedom and flourishing; and
his analysis of the self in relation to social and political life.
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2 Kremplewska’s study of Santayana’s philosophy is hermeneutic in at least a couple of
respects.  First,  there  is  her  thesis  that  Santayana’s  notion  of  the  self  is  not  an
independent  substance  or  ego,  but  an  entity  that  “emerges”  via  the  process  of
interpreting the world (17). She sums up this idea with the unusual phrase contained in
the title  of  her  book,  “life  as  insinuation,”  a  metaphor she defines  as  “introducing
something alien into something else, of grafting something upon something else” (97).
(The metaphor is borrowed from Bergson and grafted onto Santayana.) The notions of
emerging and grafting are rather different, but Kremplewska’s main point appears to be
that the human self in Santayana’s system is a conditioned reality. Her approach is also
hermeneutic in the sense that she seeks to reveal the tacit historical, psychological, and
moral motivations that purportedly led Santayana to his ontological categories of the
being of essence, the existence of matter, the actuality of spirit or consciousness, and
the eternality of truth. For Kremplewska, “[a]ny consideration of selfhood in Santayana
must take into account the fact that a naturalistic and quasi-pragmatic philosophy of
action precedes and – to some extent – determines the shape of his mature ontology”
(29).  Whether  or  not  Santayana’s  “naturalistic  and  quasi-pragmatic”  philosophy  of
action  precedes  his  mature  ontology  or  is  simply  coincidental  with  it,  so  that  the
practical element and the ontology (in particular, matter) are two ways of describing
the same thing,  Kremplewska is  certainly correct to highlight the pragmatic norms
embedded in Santayana’s ontology. 
3 Kremplewska’s project with its “large thematic scope” is an ambitious one (xvii). It is
ambitious not only because she defends a novel account of Santayana’s notion of the
self (more on this below), but also because of her sustained and groundbreaking efforts
of bringing Santayana into a comparative and critical conversation with a number of
Continental philosophers, such as Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl,
Friedrich Nietzsche, and Paul Ricœur, to name a few. By having us look through the
lens  or,  better,  lenses of  Continental  philosophy,  Kremplewska  believes  Santayana’s
ideas about the human self are clarified and thereby more readily reconstructed.
4 The  way  in  which  Kremplewska  puts  Santayana  into  conversation  with  major
Continental philosophers is often on their terms: phenomenological,  transcendental,
and with a dramatic tone (e.g.,  Santayana’s realm of matter is deemed “the sphere of
helplessness” (197)).  As  a  result,  her  reconstruction of  Santayana’s  account of  self  is
somewhat at odds with his classically-oriented, naturalistic views of human life and
ontology. In Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923), Santayana dedicates a chapter to the
“Belief in the Self.” In that chapter he defines the self not as a “transcendental ego” or
“a  flux  of  sentience,”  but  a  “substantial  being  preceding  all  the  vicissitudes  of
experience” (SAF 145). And in Realms of Being (1942), he offers a definition of “Self or
Person”  as  a  being  with  social and  political  relations  that  “lives  in  his  ambitions,
affections,  and  repute”  (Realms  of  Being,  571).  This  last  definition  would  seem  to
conform with Kremplewska’s claim that the human self emerges through the processes
of interpreting and being in the world. However, she does not give these chapters much
attention. Instead, she begins her study with a historical overview of the notion of the
self  and  subjectivity.  While  her  survey  of  the  Western  philosophical  history  of
subjectivity is extensive, the guiding thread through it is Charles Taylor’s The Sources of
the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (1995). Kremplewska appears to take Taylor’s
historical analysis of the self to be canonic. As she sees it, Taylor sets the “problematic
of selfhood in a cultural context and provides an incomparable thematic framework for
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any further discussion of Santayana’s eclectic heritage” (27). Her discussion of this idea
is multifaceted, yet her conclusion in the chapter is a modest one, namely, that when
Santayana  discusses  selfhood,  “in  the  background we  are  dealing  with  a  temporal,
dynamic, relational being, which – let us risk a suggestion – inexplicitly exhibits some
‘nature’”  (28).  This  might  be  a  risky  suggestion  for  some  philosophers,  but  it  is  a
platitude of Santayana’s naturalism, at least if by “nature” Kremplewska means some
internal  essences  or  qualities  and  external  relations  (also  “essences”)  that  are
necessary for a substantial self to exist at all.
5 The strategy of appealing to Continental philosophers is one of the most interesting
aspects  of  Kremplewska’s  book.  This  is  especially  so  with  regard  to  chapter  five,
“Coping  with  Finitude:  Santayana  Reading  Heidegger.”  By  tapping  into  Santayana’s
marginalia  on  Sein  und  Zeit,  Kremplewska  effectively  shows  that  Santayana  saw  in
Heidegger a philosophical ally with an Aristotelian orientation who was also deeply
concerned with ontology. She further shows how Santayana struggled to square several
of Heidegger’s ontological terms and categories (e.g. Dasein, being, ontish) with his own
terminology  (e.g. existence,  essence,  animal  faith).  Of  particular  interest  here  are
Santayana’s comments on Heidegger’s use of the notions of Nothing and Death (146).
Seasoned  philosophers  are  not  always  receptive  to  new  ideas,  but  Santayana  was
evidently  inspired,  as  he  wrote,  by  Heidegger’s  “profound  analysis”  of  death  as  a
“totality of life.” Santayana accepted Heidegger’s insight that, as Kremplewska puts it,
“[a]s long as a given life, counting as ‘one fact,’ is not yet framed by death, the scenario
of the play of life remains underdetermined” (145). By relying on textual evidence in
the form of Santayana’s letters discussing Heidegger and his marginalia on Heidegger’s
work, Kremplewska reveals some definite affinities between the two philosophers and
opens up new avenues for interpreting Santayana’s philosophy, although likely not to
the point, as proposed, of “rethinking [Santayana’s] entire œuvre” (xii).
6 Although  Kremplewska’s  hermeneutic,  Continental-philosophy-oriented  highlights
new angles on Santayana’s philosophy, it is not without its difficulties. One practical
difficulty  is  the  sheer  number  of  passing  references  to  various  philosophers
Kremplewska  makes  on  page  after  page  of  her  book.  The  conceptual  generality  of
Santayana’s ontological categories make it tempting to draw connections between his
system and other systems of philosophy that would appear, at least on the surface,
radically  different  (see,  for  example,  Michael  Hodges’s  and  John  Lachs’s  2000
comparative  study  Wittgenstein  and  Santayana,  Thinking  in  Ruins:  Wittgenstein  and
Santayana on Contingency).  However,  while  the multitude of  references Kremplewska
makes point toward interesting thematic connections that may be worthy of deeper
exploration,  at  times  it  is  difficult  to  discern  the  philosophy  through  all  the
philosophers. Moreover, Kremplewska’s references are often highly selective, a fact she
does  not  hide.  With  regard  to  Santayana  and  Heidegger,  she  asserts:  “I  approach
Santayana’s  notes  not  as  an  evidence  of  similarities or  of  his  ultimate  views  on
Heidegger but rather as suggestions of possible affinities, which happen to confirm my
previously existing ideas” (113). As indicated, the textual evidence she marshals clearly
shows  that  Heidegger’s  philosophy  sparked  Santayana’s  interest.  Nevertheless,  her
interpretations  sometimes  result  in  omissions  that  otherwise  might  round  out
Santayana’s  views.  For instance,  although it  is  true that Santayana praised some of
Heidegger’s  ideas as being “the work of  a  superior mind,” he also commented that
Heidegger is “[n]ot so superior as Descartes, I grant: there you have a first-rate man”
(Letters of George Santayana, MIT, 5:137). Similarly, with regard to Bergson, Kremplewska
Katarzyna Kremplewska, Life as Insinuation: George Santayana’s Hermeneutics o...
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
3
contends that both he and Santayana “represent an untypical kind of naturalism” and
that understanding Bergson’s philosophy helps us better understand Santayana’s (107).
Yet Santayana’s relationship to Bergson is more complex than Kremplewska lets on.
After publishing a review of Bergson’s work, Santayana expressed his misgivings in a
letter. “I begin to fear on the contrary that I have taken [Bergson] too seriously,” he
wrote, and that “the best way of discrediting a charlatan is perhaps not to call him one”
(Letters of George Santayana, MIT, 2:128). Kremplewska largely leaves out such criticisms
and so Santayana’s views on Heidegger and Bergson appear more aligned than actually
they are. Such interpretive difficulties are somewhat exacerbated by the fact that while
her book is nominally about Santayana’s account of human life and the self, it leans
more toward a comparative study of  his  philosophy and the ideas and concerns of
major Continental philosophers, with each chapter of the book dealing with a disparate
nest of ideas loosely connected to its nominal theme. 
7 Santayana  believed  his  philosophy  was  rooted  in  common  sense;  that  is,  in  the
everyday, instinctive convictions that govern an animal mind in the presence of nature.
In a marginal comment in Realms of Being, he deflates any metaphysical pretentions for
his system of ontology by describing it as “ordinary reflection systematized” (Realms of
Being: 827). A bedrock of his common sense philosophy is the claim that there is one
source of power in the universe: the realm of matter. Since spirit or consciousness is
not a material substance, it is not a source of power. Thus, as with the realms of essence
and truth, spirit for Santayana is real but causally inefficacious. It is generated by the
physiological functions of the human body, or what he calls the psyche, yet intrinsically
it  is  a spectator,  not an actor.  Kremplewska is well  aware of these fundamentals of
Santayana’s philosophy. However, rather than a unitary account of the self where spirit
is  matter  become conscious and the psyche is  matter’s  physiological  functions,  she
asserts  that  she  is  “inclined  to  a  view that  the  opposition  between [existence  and
essence] allows for a dynamic interplay or a dialectic under the condition that a third
element – that of a conscious life/a psycho-spiritual unity – is introduced” (39). This
additional unity is the self. “The self proper,” she writes, “as I propose, stands for a
triadic temporal structure of psyche-spirit-I, or, alternatively, body-psyche-spirit” (45).
This  “psycho-spiritual  unity”  with  an  “irreducible  first-person  perspective”  would
appear  to  be  something  over  and above  the  human animal  taken in  its  social  and
political  relations,  at  least  insofar  as  it  has  “dynamic  interplay”  with  the  realm of
matter  (46).  If  the self  is  some kind of  emergent  substance possessed with “triadic
existential  dynamics,”  then  Kremplewska’s  reconstruction  would  contravene
Santayana’s naturalism or at least his epiphenomenalism (64). That said, it is possible
that she does not intend to substantialize the self and turn it into a power. Much of
what  she  writes  works  toward  a  reconfiguration  of  the  concepts  or  “dialectic
distinctions” that Santayana employs to articulate his ontology and account of the self
while still respecting his view that matter is the only substantial reality or source of
power. If this is her position, then her reconstruction of Santayana’s triadic account of
the self would still be novel, but it would not contravene his naturalism.
8 The last chapter of Kremplewska’s book, “Beyond the Self (into the Political Realm),”
with  its  subtitle  “The  Essential  Negativity  of  Human  Being  and  Rational
(Self-)Government,” takes up ideas some of which concern the self directly, such as the
material  basis  of  the  self  in  politics,  while  other  ideas  address  more  generally
Santayana’s  views  on  political  freedom and his  critique  of  19th early  20th  century
liberalism. In this short, dense chapter there are passages where she appears to sum up
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Santayana’s political philosophy neatly and accurately, such as when she writes that:
“Freedom in Santayana’s writings often stands for a harmonious relation between the
self and necessity. Thus, it is closely related to self-rule, vital liberty, and rationality”
(198).  Other  claims  she  makes  seem  antithetical  to  Santayana’s  view  for  rational
government,  for  example,  when  she  asserts  that  the  “ideal  aim  of  successful  self-
government… [according to Santayana] is fully achievable – if at all – only for someone
who has learned to transcend worldly concerns and dwell the realm of spirit” (206).
This last claim conflates Santayana’s account of the spiritual life with his account of the
life of reason in politics. The two might go together or they might not; in Santayana’s
philosophy they are separable. Kremplewska’s interpretation of what Santayana means
by a political domination and a power is also uncertain. For Santayana, the distinction is
moral  and not material,  but Kremplewska calls  them “active vectors in the field of
forces,” which suggest the distinction is material (199). She might be led away from
Santayana’s meaning since she appears to cast doubt on his moral relativism, an axiom
in Santayana’s philosophy, but which is characterized as “the alleged moral relativism
ascribed by some critics of Santayana” (210).
9 I suspect that for many readers the picture of Santayana’s philosophy in Kremplewska’s
book will seem unfamiliar. His system, intended to clarify common sense, is found to be
riddled with “inescapable aporias” (41). His naturalism, set out in Realms of Being and
that  reaches  back  to  the  writings  of  Democritus,  Epicurus,  and  Lucretius,  is
characterized (indirectly) as the views of “a thinker encaged in a glass house of his own
philosophical  idiosyncrasies,  radicalized  by  a  growing  mystical  bent”  (xiii).  And
Kremplewska’s triadic account of Santayana’s notion of the self appears to run counter
to  Santayana’s  unitary  substantial  self.  These  differences  in  interpretation  aside,
Kremplewska  presents  Santayana’s  philosophy  in a  spectrum  of  new  light  and
challenges  those  familiar  with  his  writings  to  reexamine  many  aspects  of  his
philosophy. And if one is looking for a through-line from Santayana’s philosophy to the
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